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Introduction
Fiscal equalization schemes are an important feature of public finance frameworks. Countries that have implemented fiscal equalization schemes include Canada, Switzerland, Australia and Germany. In the United States, an explicit federal equalization scheme for reducing fiscal disparities between the states does not exist. However, certain vertical federal-state transfers, e.g. education programs aimed at the disadvantaged, food and nutrition programs and Medicaid, have an equalizing component.
Theoretical research on the incentives of fiscal equalization schemes and federalism in general has a long tradition. Pioneering works on the assignment of functions to different governmental layers and appropriate fiscal instruments date back to Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) . The role of inter-regional spillover effects due to mobile tax bases or interregional externalities in the provision of public goods is investigated in Oates (1972) , Boadway and Flatters (1982) , Inman and Rubinfeld (1992) , or Manasse and Schultz (1999) .
Other scholars investigate asymmetric information over local preferences for public goods (e.g. Cremer et al., 1996; Bucovetsky et al., 1998) , over technologies for the provision of public goods (e.g. Boadway et al., 1995; Raff and Wilson, 1997; Caplan et al., 2000; Breuillé and Gary-Bobo, 2007; Akai and Silva, 2009) , and over local tax bases (Bordignon et al., 2001 ).
The present study investigates the relationships between fiscal equalization in a federation and tax enforcement of the member states. Germany serves as our laboratory. The investigation takes advantage of three German particularities. First, Germany's federal system is cooperative: the tariffs of all the fiscally important taxes, the so-called joint taxes, 1 are set by the central government, and a uniform tax tariff applies in all German states. Second, the enforcement of the tax law is delegated to the states. Third, the fiscal-equalization system implies that marginal tax-back rates on tax revenues collected by a state ( ) are low (usually less than 25 percent) and can differ substantially across states. The remainder of marginal tax revenue, the marginal rate of loss, is distributed horizontally or vertically.
Marginal tax-back rates differ across states and over time, and they are basically exogenous for state governments.
The three particularities of the German system may lead to moral hazard problems at the state level: On the one hand, the states are responsible for and also bear the full costs of tax enforcement (i.e. the endowment of tax offices with personnel and IT). On the other hand, each state internalizes only of marginal tax revenue. 2 The remainder, 1 , is a fiscal externality. Several theoretical works have shown that such fiscal externalities result in inefficient state tax policies in terms of overall costs and benefits to society (e.g., Oates, 1999; Bordignon et al., 2001; Traxler and Reutter, 2008) .
At first glance, it appears that the uniformity of the tariffs of the joint taxes in Germany prevents the states from reacting to such fiscal externalities. However, as explained above, the states are responsible for the enforcement of the tax law, and a well-defined uniform 'golden' standard guiding the enforcement is lacking. Indeed, the states decide on the endowment of tax offices with personnel and technical equipment. The states decide on the training standards for taxmen and their work procedures (e.g., the fraction of tax returns that is audited). The states also decide on the rules that are applied whenever the tax law is vague.
In the present paper we explore if the internalized marginal tax returns lead to differences in tax enforcement across the states. If so, a uniform tax tariff de jure will not guarantee a uniform tax tariff de facto, resulting in inefficient enforcement activities from the viewpoint of the overall economy (for similar argumentations see Baretti et al., 2002; Mikesell, 2003; Esteller-Moré, 2005; Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2005; Libman and Feld, 2007) . Further, the principle of equal treatment of equals will be jeopardized, undermining the tax moral of the tax payers.
Our first contribution is that we set up a stylized Samuelson (1954) type model that captures the aforementioned three particularities of Germany's tax and federal system. The model reveals that benevolent state-level planners align the effective tax burdens of their taxpayers with the internalized marginal tax revenue ( ) that can be generated from a taxpayer. The is the product of two variables: the marginal tax rate of a tax unit and the state-specific marginal tax-back rate ( ). Hence, the reveals how a marginal variation of the tax base of a resident of a particular state alters the tax revenue of the same state. The model shows that the effective tax burden of a given taxpayer will systematically vary with the tax back rate of the state the taxpayer lives in: Provided that the substitution effect dominates the income effect, the effective tax burden of the taxpayer (the enforcement of taxation) will be positively related with .
Our second contribution is empirically: We test if internalized marginal tax returns matter for tax enforcement activities of the states. The empirical analysis comprises a state-level and a micro-level approach. The state-level approach investigates if state-wide tax enforcement activities (as captured by the endowment of tax offices) depend on the internalized marginal returns from taxation. The state-level approach has several weaknesses (discussed in Section 4). As an example, it requires assumptions on the tax-collection technology. For this reason, we complement the state-level with a micro-level approach using administrative data on individual income tax returns. In the micro-level approach we investigate whether taxpayers with the same tax-relevant characteristics (i.e., gross market income; tax deductions; marital status; number of children) but resident in different states (with different ) share the same tax burdens. If tax burdens systematically differ across states, this is an immediate indication of differences in tax enforcement activities. The tests are performed by means of a regression and a difference-in-differences approach. Results from both approaches support the model's implication: the higher the internalized returns from taxation, the higher the level of tax enforcement.
The interplay between fiscal equalization and taxation has also been addressed in earlier literatures. Most of this literature deals with fiscal equalization and locally-decided taxes.
Related studies for Germany are Buettner (2006) and Egger et al. (2009) . Our research question, however, is different, namely how fiscal equalization impacts states' tax enforcement under a uniform tax law. We are aware of only two studies dealing with this nexus. One study is Traxler and Reutter (2008) . It provides a theoretical analysis, but not an empirical examination. Another study is Baretti et al. (2002) . It provides a theoretical analysis, and some indirect empirical evidence. None of the studies provides a direct econometric analysis on the interplay between fiscal equalization and tax enforcement. The present paper fills this gap in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces Germany's federal system and the income-tax law. Section 3 presents our theoretical model. Our database is described in Section 4. Section 5 provides the econometric analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 offers some concluding remarks.
Federalism in Germany

The fiscal-equalization system
Germany's federal structure is reflected by three governmental layers: the federal layer (Bund), the state layer (Bundesländer), and the local layer (Gemeinde). Since the German reunification in 1990, sixteen Laender form the state layer and about 11,500 municipalities the local layer.
Germany's federal system is cooperative: all the fiscally important taxes are set by the central government, and redistributive horizontal and vertical transfers mitigate regional fiscal imbalances so that regional levels of public goods and services are similar (Art. 107, Para. 2, 1, German Federal Constitution). Essentially, transfers are channeled from relatively wealthy states to poorer ones. The level of the transfer depends on the state-specific "fiscal capacity"
and "fiscal needs." Basically, fiscal capacity is determined by tax return per inhabitant (before equalization); fiscal needs by average tax return per inhabitant over all the 16 states.
Total tax revenue of a state originates from two sources: the so-called own-source taxes and the joint taxes. Own-source taxes are administered and collected by the states (or municipalities), and the generated tax revenue exclusively benefits the state (or municipality).
Inheritance, property acquisition, and lottery taxes are examples for own-source taxes.
Revenues from own-source taxes, however, contribute only a small fraction to total tax revenue. The joint taxes (income, corporation and value added tax) contribute the dominant fraction. In year 2011, for example, the joint taxes made up about 70 percent of total tax revenue. 3 The common characteristic of the joint taxes is that the tax revenue is shared among the three federal layers. A four-stage equalization system, overviewed in In addition, special needs grants (Sonderbedarfsbundesergänzungszuweisungen) compensate for special fiscal burdens some states have to bear. These grants are given lump-sum, regardless of fiscal or economic performance.
Table 1 about here
Germany's four-stage fiscal equalization system drives a substantial wedge between states' tax revenue before and after fiscal equalization. At the margin, state-specific tax-back rates on state tax revenues ( ) are usually less than 25 percent. The remainder, the marginal rate of loss (1 ), is redistributed horizontally or vertically. Due to the complexity of the legal rules of the fiscal-equalization system, it is not feasible to express by means of a simple closed form, say as a function of tax revenue, type of tax revenue, and number of inhabitants.
All variations of such and other determinants precipitate themselves in stages 2 to 4 of the transfer system (also Baretti et al., 2002, p. 646 9 paragraphs in the income tax law. Indeed, a report of the Federal Audit Office (2006, p. 78f.) remarks: "some countries give the impression that the hiring of tax auditors is not interesting due to fiscal equalization; net contributor states had to pay the dominant part of eventual additional tax revenue in the fiscal equalization system, while transfers were reduced for the net recipient state." In a summarizing statement of the same report it is argued that differences in the personnel endowments of tax offices undermine the "uniformity of taxation in Germany" (Federal Audit Office, 2006, p. 122) .
Further indications of a politically motivated tax practice have been provided in previous literature:
1. Vogel (2000, as well as Schick (2011) find systematic differences in tax revenue per audit and state specific tax auditing frequencies. In the city state 14 Hamburg, for example, many income millionaires are resident. The auditing rate of these millionaires' income tax returns, however, is substantially lower than in other states (Schick, 2011) . 3. To harmonize tax audits, recently a risk management system has been implemented in all tax offices. The system evaluates roughly 2,500 positions in income tax returns, and indicates potential incongruities between the positions.
Harmonization was not achieved, because the states modified the detection algorithms independently, and because tax offices responded differently to potential incongruities (Federal Audit Office, 2009, p. 176-179; Federal Audit Office 2012, p. 30) . If the system selects a tax return for special audit, it is not secured that this auditing is appropriately conducted. Instead, according to several State Audit Offices, the error rate rates from 12 percent (North Rhine Westphalia) to 52 percent (Brandenburg).
14 Three German cities (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg) are also independent federal states. 4. Vogel (2000) provides evidence that certain tax payers had been treated preferentially by the states. Examples include generous interpretation of amortization rules or the postponement of tax payments.
In sum, the states bear the full costs related to the enforcement of the income tax law (e.g., related to the endowment of tax offices), but they internalize only part of the resulting tax revenues (due to the redistributive fiscal equalization scheme). Due to the decentralized administration, the means of the central level to control the tax collection process are limited.
So the states have both the opportunity and the incentive to align tax enforcement activities with their own objectives, and in this respect may play a prominent role. As outlined above, several state-level indicators suggest differences in state-specific tax enforcement levels. However, the empirical evidence is basically anecdotic and also lacks a rigorous econometric testing. 
with
where denotes income tax revenue after the initial assignment of taxes according to division rules in stage 1 of Germany's fiscal equalization system. The term ̅ 0.575 gives the share from income tax revenue assigned to the state level (including the state's municipalities), and , , ∆ is the effective tax burden imposed on tax unit . The effective tax burden of hinges on the progressive tax tariff, , on 's gross taxable income,
, and the level of granted deductions, ∆ . We assume that gross taxable income is exogenous from the taxman's point of view.
The second term in the state's budget constraint is the net equalizing transfers,
For net-recipient (net-contributor) states, i.e. for states with a below-average (above-average)
per-capita fiscal capacity, the net equalizing transfer is positive (negative). accounts for further particular regulations inherent in Germany's fiscal equalization system. Across the states, equalizing transfers add up to zero, i.e.,
(4)
The third term in the state's budget constraint (1), are lump sum vertical transfers, i.e. special needs grants.
For a tax unit, we assume that preferences are characterized by an additive utility function of
with denoting the level of a private good, the numéraire, and with denoting the level of a state-level public good. Accordingly, we abstain from modeling public good spillover effects. The budget constraint of a tax unit is,
Suppose , , … , , … and an interior solution exists. Further, suppose state planners "act as benevolent maximiser of their citizens' welfare" (Edwards and Keen, 1995, p. 113) . Finally suppose the citizens' welfare in state 1 (and the other states) is described by a
Bentham social welfare function, ∑ . The optimization problem of a state planner is,
The solution is,
The benevolent planner in state "1" choses ∆ * , … , ∆ * , * so that the optimality condition Equation (8) (8) implies that then the level of tax deductions granted to taxpayer 1 should be lower than for taxpayer 1 . This is because the internalized returns from tax enforcement are higher in state 1 compared to state 2. 17 For example, the states can steer the effective tax burdens by the fraction of tax returns that is audited, or by the 'generosity' of the taxmen concerning the granting of tax deductions.
Equation (8) As the amount of observations is -with annually roughly 3 million tax units -rather high we assume that the data are representative both for the national and for the state level.
FAST is provided in form of three cross-sectional scientific-use-files, covering data for the assessment years 1998, 2001, and 2004. These three cross sections form our database.
Unfortunately, more recent data are not available. This is for two reasons. First, tax units have 17 The argumentation requires that the substitution effect always dominates the income effect. It must also be ensured that variations of discretionary deductions and corresponding changes in income tax revenue have at most a small effect on . As Figures 1a-c indicated, this is not a too strong assumption. As pointed out in Section 2.1, in the empirical examination are indeed exogenous.
an extensive period to file their income tax statements before the statements are audited and processed by the tax collecting authority. For complex income tax statements the whole process can easily take up to five years. Second, once the taxation process is completed, the data must be assembled by the state statistical offices and forwarded to the federal statistical office, where the scientific use files are prepared.
FAST allows the identification of all relevant steps from gross taxable income ( ) to the actual tax base on which the income tax liability is calculated. The difference between and the actual tax base is the sum of all granted deductions (∆ ) and serves as our measure of effective tax administration. The idea is the following. If the tax unit is risk averse it will declare all relevant incomes to the tax authorities. These reported incomes serve as our gross taxable income, , and is exogenous from the taxman's point of view. To reduce its tax burden, the tax unit will try to claim as many deductions from the gross taxable income as possible and the taxman will either grant them or not. While we cannot observe if all the claimed deductions are granted we can observe the actual deduction as difference between gross taxable income and the fixed tax base, hence our measure ∆ . If we effectively control for all the relevant characteristics (which are provided in our data) the level of granted deduction ∆ should not systematically vary between states. However, systematic differences may occur mainly due to two reasons: First, when granting deduction the taxman may have a margin of discretion. Theses discretionary deductions are subject to vague legal terms ("unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe"). Accordingly, the taxmen have some discretion regarding the interpretation of the case-relevant characteristics that determine the granted deduction (for a detailed discussion see Vogel, 2000, p. 73-75 Therefore, total granted deductions can serve as a measure how strict tax returns are audited by the local taxman. 18 An overview of norms in the German income tax code that incorporate vague legal terms is provided in Bönke et al. (2011), Table A1 in the Appendix.
Descriptive figures from income tax statistics
Figures 2a-c give the state-and period specific distributions of effective internalized marginal revenues ( ). Each figure comprises sixteen graphs. In each graph, a state specific distribution of (solid line) is benchmarked against the German average (dashed line).
The differences between the two distributions mirror differences in the state-specific income distributions and s.
Figures 2a-2c about here
In order to compare the concept of and , : the average of the individual marginal tax rates of the residents in a state (as provided in Table A1 ) times the state's (provided in Table 2 ). The higher is , the higher is the internalized revenue and the incentive to secure an effective tax enforcement. As can be seen from 5 Econometric analysis
Regressions using state-level variables
We start our analysis with a "macro-econometric" model using state-level aggregates in the spirit of studies such as Baretti et al (2002) . The basic idea of such a model is to econometrically explain the state-wide level of tax enforcement by , after controlling for other state-level variables. Particularly, we measure tax enforcement by an input variable, the staffing of tax offices: the state-wide number of income tax returns divided by the number of full time equivalent employees in the financial administration. The smaller the ratio, so the argument, the better the endowment of the tax offices, and the higher is the enforcement level.
The state-level approach has two central weaknesses. First, economies of scale in tax administration are not well understood. In the presence of increasing returns to scale, highly populated states might enforce the tax law more effectively with the same staffing of tax offices compared to low populated states. Second, the approach does not control for differences in the distributions of individual s across states (but uses a state-wide indicator). However, equation (8) . 19 The definition of all the explanatory variables follows the same logic. Hence, the state-level regression is,
The change in tax enforcement incentives, ∆ , is measured alternatively as (a) change in tax-back rates, ∆ , ,
(specification S1.1); (b) change in average rate of internalized marginal revenues, ∆ , ,
(specification S1.2). Further control variables include the change in gross domestic product per capita, , the change in population density per square kilometer, , and a citystate dummy, . All underlying values for the construction of the variable are provide in Table A2 in the Appendix.
The results of the two specifications are displayed in Table 4 . In the first specification, the regression coefficient of ∆ carries the expected sign (a higher incentive for enforcing the tax law means that fewer taxpayers are audited per full time employee in a state's financial administration). However, the coefficient is insignificant. One possible explanation provides the optimality condition (8): tax enforcement depends on the tax back rate together with the distribution of individual marginal tax rates. Accordingly, tax-back rates are only an imprecise proxy for the incentive of a state to enforce the tax law. 20 Specification S1.2 considers the interaction of tax back rates and individual marginal tax rates by averaging the s of all taxpayers in a state. Now the regression coefficient pertaining ∆ carries the expected negative sign and is significant at a 10 percent level.
In sum, the results of the state-level approach support our research hypothesis that higher internalized returns of taxation lead to higher tax enforcement activities at the state level. Table 5 . Table 5 provides a summary of the regressions. The covariates of interest are subsumed under . All four regression specification, convey the same consistent story: the higher the incentive to enforce the tax law, the lower is the level of granted tax deductions (controlled for all other aforementioned covariates). According to specification S2.1 the regression coefficient for equals -1.227. Assuming that average granted deduction amount to 6,000 Euro (see Table A1 ), the coefficient indicates that rising the internalized tax revenue ( ) by 5 percentage point lowers granted tax deduction by 360 Euro. According to specification S2.2, this inverse relationship between and tax deductions is confirmed even after additionally controlling for individual marginal tax rates. Specifications S2.3 and S2.4 show that both components of the , and marginal tax rates, matter for granted tax deductions, and for both components the inverse relationship is reconfirmed.
Natural experiments
As outlined above, there are two groups of states: one group where s vary over time (Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, and Hamburg); another group where s are about constant over time. Accordingly, tax-enforcement incentives (captured by ) change in the former but not in the latter group. Since is an exogenous variable from the viewpoint of the states, the setting is like a natural experiment: residents of the former states are the "treated,"
and residents of the latter are the "controls."
The econometric device to isolate the effect of the treatment is the difference-in-differences estimator (DiD). The DiD estimator is the difference between two differences: the difference in tax deductions before and after treatment among the treated, and the same difference among the controls. The control group should be composed of tax units resident in states with an inter-temporally stable with tax-relevant characteristics similar to the treated. and poses no problem. Furthermore, the characteristics of the treated in the control group (residents of the control states) have to be reproduced. The standard procedure to achieve this goal is statistical matching. After the matching, the effect of the treatment on the treated is estimated over the common support, , i.e. the part of the distribution of characteristics that is both represented among the treated and the controls. As our analysis relies on repeated cross-sections, we have implemented the statistical matching over three groups: the treated and the non-treated in the initial period before treatment, , and the non-treated at (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2008, p. 58) . Then the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator after matching is (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2008, p. 59) ,
In equation (11), , denote the treatment before and after treatment and , the respective control groups; denotes the weight attributed to tax unit belonging to group in period when comparing with the treated tax unit ; reconstructs the outcome distribution for the treated in the base sample.
To implement the difference-in-differences estimator (11), propensity scores must be estimated using both the treated and the controls. In case of multiple cross-sections, the dependent variable, the dummy variable indicating the base sample after treatment, is set to one if the tax unit is treated and the observation period is t ( ) and to zero otherwise.
Then the two control groups ( , ) and the treated before treatment ( ) are matched to the treated after treatment separately. Accordingly, the common support comprises the treated units for whom a counterfactual tax unit is found in all three control samples (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008) .
The natural experiments underlying our DiD approach encompass Schleswig-Holstein 1998 -2001 , Bavaria 1998 -2001 , and Hamburg 2001 -2004 As outlined above, the DiD approach relies on four groups , , and : For each partitioned group, we have implemented a prospensity score based nearest-neighbor matching: an observation from the potential control group is chosen as a matching partner for a treated observation that is closest in terms of the propensity score. The matching considers the following characteristics of the tax units: taxable base before discretionary deductions and its square; 23 number of children (for the two sub-groups where children are present); age; dummies for the seven income sources (1 if revenues are positive; zero else); and church membership. 24 Up to five neighbors had been allowed.
Figures A1a to A1c in the Appendix provide the resulting propensity score distributions.
Results for Schleswig Holstein are provided in Figure A1a , for Bavaria in A1b, and for Hamburg in A1c. In each of the Figures, three symmetry plots are provided. Each symmetry plot depicts the propensity score distribution for the treated group after treatment, (black shaded distribution above the horizontal axis), against one of the three groups, , or (distribution below the horizontal axis). As can be seen from the graphs, the propensity scores are highly symmetric, indicating that the distributions of observational characteristics are similar across groups. This can also be seen from the descriptive statistics provided in Tables   A4a to A4c in the Appendix.
Difference-in-differences estimators from equation (11) together with jackknife standard errors are summarized in Table 6 . Further, the effect of treatment on collected income taxes in a treated state is provided. To compute this effect, we, first, have applied the tax schedule of period to the taxable bases of the treated in . This gives the original tax burdens of the treated. Subsequently, we have corrected for the treatment by adding to the taxable bases, and simulated the counterfactual treatment-corrected individual tax burdens by applying the respective tax tariff. Finally, we have computed differences between treatment-corrected and original tax burdens, and aggregated the differences over all the treated tax units.
Consequently, a positive (negative) number translates into forgone (additional) tax revenue. By means of a stylized model we show that state authorities have incentives to align the effective tax rates of their residents to the internalized marginal returns from taxation. We empirically test the model using two workhorses, regressions and a natural-experiment design, and our estimates support the model's prediction: the higher the fraction of additional tax revenues a state internalizes, the stricter it enforces the tax law, as reflected in lower levels of tax deductions.
From the viewpoint of a single state it is rational to align tax enforcement activities with the fraction of additional tax revenue that the state internalizes. However, the alignment causes fiscal externalities, and these imply that state-specific tax enforcement activities are inefficient (too low) from the viewpoint of the overall economy. Further, differences in enforcement activity across the states violate the principle of equal treatment of equal, undermining the tax moral of the taxpayers. Note. In addition to stage 1 to 4 some provinces receive special need grants that are paid lump-sum. 
